I see something that goes on then at the eastern end of the Mediterranean area where today we're having all the Israeli-Arab problems and so forth. I've been on the Committee of the Mayor of Jerusalem on an International Committee which he formed to advise him on Jerusalem to try to keep the multi-world viewpoint operative in Jerusalem. And in my studying of Jerusalem and its history, it is extraordinary the numbers of times that it has changed hands, and what it apparently is what I spoke to you about the Sea of Aesoph, and that there is a northerly route, there is a predominantly southerly there were four routes, but I could break them into two northerlies and two southerlies. The overland Sea of Aesoph one is really the Marco Polo kind of route. Now, I say on the three other ones, you come pretty south because you get into Persia, and they tend to get to the Arabian Gulf or they can come overland. But, there is enormous competition between who is going to control the taking from the orient and cashing-in in Europe.

And I see, then, that halfway between the north and the south routes would be Jerusalem. Jerusalem, then, is where the north became very powerful and the people of the north came in, and it was just the maximum outpost that you could reach. And the southerly people came in, and they would lick them. So you have Egypt trying to take over, and we had to finally get where the northerlies like the Crusaders coming down and fighting the Saracens in the South. The, in that extraordinary battle of the Mediterranean, we find that the last great chapter that is the chapter of Venice which is taken over from the Phoenicians Venetians, and the Crete and so forth.

And, suddenly, the mathematics that I have spoken to you about, becomes so improved, with Arabic numerals, that we have the King of Portugal, then suddenly with mathematical capability you've calculated a great deal better about building ships. You've calculated very much better for your navigation, so Henry the Navigator, opens up an entirely new world, and building really big rib ships much bigger, more powerful, and going from Europe right around Africa all the way to India and the Orient, China. Very much better than the interrupted routes that you had coming through the Near East, where you had overland, and water, many transfer points but you could go all the way from Europe, all the way to the Orient.

And this came about due to the enormously improved technology that developed also in mathematical capability. So that the, from the time of the Leonardos on, you see there were no more Leonardos, because the great masters of the great land areas who were able to build ships, then really took their Leonardos to sea with them, and they became really the great designing Admirals of the fleets designing extraordinary ships and more and more technology of the sea.

And so, what happened, starting with Troy, is that the line of supply took over on the fortification. And, as, getting very much later to World War II, World War I, rather. W.W.I was a question of the line of supply and we had gotten to the point where these great navies of the Atlantic, where the Spanish ran it called the Spanish Main for a long time, all this enormous amount of gold they were taking out of South America and Central America suddenly that is broken. But we have firstly the Portuguese, and then the Spanish both keep working north, more northerly people apparently getting a little greater strength. And we have what we call the British Isles then. All this picture goes on in this piece here, where they've taken from here, where the 52% of humanity's longest, old history, developing enormous riches, and taking its wisdom and its riches to here. The British Isles, then, became the unsinkable flagships, commanding the most harbors of the most customers, and those islands were just fought over by water people, so the Irish Coast, there is hardly a foot along it that hasn't had bloody battles. Along the Irish Coast, the Scottish Coast, everybody saying who can control those Isles. So the Anglos and the Jutes are long ago displaced, and very powerful people kept pouring in there to see who was going to control it. And as I said, whoever controlled that, then, controlled the great sea traffic between the orient and Europe.

But the, from now on, everything is line of supply. I said then, we have the navy battles, in contradistinction to land I was a regular United States Naval Officer at the time of World War I, and it was said that when the High Seas Fleet comes out or the two High Seas Fleets come there would be, you'd have what you call a contact. And with contact, they said, you'll know within the first or the second salvo who's going to run the world for the next 25 years. You compare your hardware. And it really was a matter of engineering design by now. You had to have good skills of seamanship sure. But the big thing was, do you have guns that could outperform? who could carry the greatest hitting power, the greatest distance, in the shortest time with the greatest accuracy and the least effort. And, so, nothing was more really secret on these ships than with two ships of the same tonnage, they looked the same, they are designed with about the same experience humanity has had by now over the seas, so they can make it a little bigger type so there are all kinds of different types of ships for different purposes, whether it is a destroyer or whatever it is tonnage. And you don't know until contact who with the same tonnage can outdo do more with the same tonnage than the other man. This was the most highly classified of all the information of the navies and of the air, whatever it is. And what goes on in the "puppetry" warfare between Russia and the United States is trying to keep sounding out the other guy, and see if you can see what he is going to do with his tonnage. The scale can always get tipped, and both sides can keep up apparently about the same, but suddenly, contact. Who does more with the same, or more with less?

Now, that brings you up to very modern strategy. At any rate, I spoke about Navy then is contact. And it's all over very quickly. So, we have World War II, the Blitzkreig was simply the sea warfare coming up for contact on the land. So the ship of the sky and the tank were simply the submarine coming up on land with wheels on it, and really a mobile fortress. We have the Maginot line was the end, historically, of the bigger and heavier and higher the walls, the more secure. Suddenly Blitzkreig just went right over it, and it didn't count anymore. This was really, historically, much more important than people can realize, because it has to do then with the fundamental sort of mobility, and what comes out of the sea, and the engineering. I've given you all kinds of recounts where we were looking at people doing all the right things for the wrong reasons, and doing things out of misassumptions of economics, but mainly I want to review then what the technology of it was, And, so, the big transition that begins with the fall of Troy ends with the Maginot line of the static of just building so that "might does the trick." From now on it really is capability. Improved doing more with less. And so we go very rapidly into the sky now where one little airplane suddenly sinks a whole battle cruiser, as General Mitchell saw it can do way back just after World War I.

And so, I'm now trying to confront you with patterns of very big significance, where there are very great changes, and to get a feeling about their doing more with less on the sea. Because when I came into the Navy, then, with the kind of history that I do have, that I have reviewed with you, where suddenly things are happening very rapidly. All of the "impossible" things were happening. I was then trained as a United States Naval Officer was, in the following terms. We suddenly had the telegraph, back in the beginning of the l9th century. But Abraham Lincoln was the first head of state to be wired by telegraph to each of the battle fronts. Up to this time, the Head of State, the head man had to be present at the critical battle, to make the critical decisions but suddenly he could be in a central position. And this was a very new game. But there were no wires from the city of Washington, Abraham Lincoln, to the Navy.

Suddenly World War I and we did have the radio, and we assumed that the enemy could decipher and decode you, and therefore we didn't send messages by radio, that would be of a highly strategic nature. Those messages had to go by courier. And the courier couldn't go any faster than a ship could go. Historically, then, once you put somebody in command of the navy, and really the navy was a risk of the most powerful people on the land the land owners began to really go to sea with their ships. They got into a new kind of a game with the world. And they were interested in the commerce, and they had a lot of people, then, doing the farming they're not doing that farming anymore themselves that's out.

The big attention, then, and the power that said we were going to go to war was in the sea. And the masters of the water-ocean world, then, had in the navy they were, whoever was in command of the navy, you had all the powers of that nation. In fact, there is no such thing as a second hand navy the capability to run the world was in that navy, so when that navy went to sea, it had to have something on board there. The people who were in the highest authority, had to have someone on board there they could trust. Very capable, that really understood the world, and would think world. So the training of a naval officer was a very different kind of training than the training of the land. And so you were put in every type of ship. You were put into a navy yard so that you would get to be an industrialist. You would be put into jurisprudence here so that you would understand those matters at sea. You were put into state craft as a naval attach, but the assignments were very short six months, nine months, a year and they'd get you onto the next one. They had to get you absolutely comprehensivists. I found it absolutely exciting that they have Harvard and the land Universities going in for specialization, the navy went in exactly the opposite direction, they picked out the very brightest of every class, and first they sent them to the Bureau of Ships which is a series of ships itself, and they did everything they could to make the naval officer a COMPREHENSIVIST.

Now, there was the power structure that had to be the comprehensivist, and the people had to be divided. And, I ran into a completely different world when I got into the Navy, and I was astonished by it by the absolute line of the United States Navy. You were being trained so that if your senior were killed, you could take over. Therefore you had to be able to take over, be skipper of the ship and I was skipper of several ships in the navy. If your Admiral went over, then you had to take over the fleet.

The naval officers being trained in this way, to be comprehensivists, to be absolutely capable of taking over. And the promotion of the naval officers in contradistinction to the army the army was done by the number, and it was just a matter of keeping succeeding by the number. But the Navy was entirely by selection. After Lt. Commander, to get where there is gold on your cap, this is entirely by selection so that whoever were the big powers of the world, if they liked this young man, and they really thought he was going to come they could move him right up to Admiral of the Fleet overnight. It was, then, a very different kind of service, and the kind of information I came into was fascinating because, at the time of World War I, the world had been run up to that time by the British Empire. The United States had no ambitions to be a world people at all, and the United States got drawn in on trying to save democracy. As we said, both sides, the Germans and the English, tried to bring her in, because the question of the who was going to run they were interested in who was going to run the water-ocean world.